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EU energy market liberalisationBulgaria is a signiﬁcant natural gas transit state in the EU (a role set to increase with the South Stream
and potential Nabucco West gas pipelines) and a Member State subject to EU regulation. As a result,
the regulation of natural gas in the country is of direct relevance to the development, implementation
and realisation of EU energy security policy. However, the transposition of the EU’s Third Energy package
seem to be dependent on the role of intermediaries in the process of transiting natural gas through and
within Bulgaria. This paper uses a conceptual frame which merges literature on energy infrastructure
networks, intermediaries and power to explain some key problems for natural gas supply policy in Bul-
garia and the lack of transparency within the sector. The conclusion offers an explanation of how the exis-
tence of Bulgarian intermediaries inﬂuences the use of national natural gas pipelines as transmission
belts for national, Russian and EU policy, as well as a series of objectives including: increasing household
gasiﬁcation, further liberalisation of the Bulgarian natural gas market and increasing transparency in Bul-
garian energy policy.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).Introduction
This paper explores the role of Bulgarian intermediaries in
refracting the use of the natural gas transit pipeline as a transmis-
sion belt for Bulgarian state, Russian state and EU policy objectives,
investigating the way state intermediaries operate and work with
others to produce speciﬁc geometries of power and affect policy.
The paper offers insights into state intermediaries, the ﬂow of pat-
terns of resources and the effect on policy by intermediaries. In
doing so it constructs a more thorough understanding of energy
policy in Bulgaria, and Europe. With approximately one third of
EU gas imports currently sourced from Russia (Eurostat, 2014)
and total technical capacity for natural gas transit transmission
through Bulgaria of 18.7 bcm p.a. (Bulgartransgaz, 2014), the regu-
lation of natural gas in Bulgaria is of direct relevance to the imple-
mentation of EU energy policy. The paper explores the inﬂuence of
two speciﬁc Bulgarian intermediaries (Bulgargaz and Bulgartrans-
gaz) on achieving a series of key objectives for Bulgarian state,EU and Russian state policy, including: increasing household gasi-
ﬁcation; further liberalisation of the Bulgarian natural gas market;
and increasing transparency in Bulgarian energy policy.
The EU’s Energy Roadmap 2050 (European Commission, 2011b)
sets out the objectives of a signiﬁcant role for natural gas as a tran-
sition fuel, diversiﬁcation of natural gas imports and the full liber-
alisation of the natural gas market (further discussed in
Section ‘Why natural gas matters to the EU’). However, in Bulgaria
there have been signiﬁcant delays in: (1) diversifying natural gas
imports; (2) the full liberalisation of the internal market; (3) trans-
position of EU legislation; and (4) increasing the very low levels of
residential gasiﬁcation. These delays have resulted from problems
in the implementation of the Bulgarian national energy policy
caused by the presence and operation of a set of Bulgarian state-
owned natural gas intermediaries.
The explanation for these delays is that the natural gas pipeline
system of Bulgaria is a key space of power resistance and domina-
tion between stakeholders. Intermediaries are deﬁned by Moss
et al. (2011) as organisations strategically located in-between reg-
ulators and regulated public and private actors, or sets of different
societal interests. Although intermediaries may mediate or facili-
tate between groups of actors they are never neutral in dealing
with others and are capable to translate, redeﬁne and fundamen-
tally change what they transport (Moss et al., 2011; Latour,
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companies Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz – as intermediaries in
the transportation of natural gas through and within the country
– has undermined the meaningful transposition and implementa-
tion of EU legislation, as well as the stated government objective
within the Bulgarian energy strategies of 20081 and 2011 of signif-
icantly increasing residential gasiﬁcation (Bulgarian Government,
2008: 16, 52, 2011: 11).
Although the timely and successful transposition of the EU third
energy package in Bulgaria is in the interest of Overgas Inc. (a Gaz-
prom joint stock company which would receive access to Bulgar-
gaz’s pipelines and increase the number of its residential
consumers) the sole ownership and management of the national
pipeline infrastructure is a stronghold for the interests of the Bul-
garian state. Despite intermediaries’ power to undermine state pol-
icies, relinquishing control over the pipelines would introduce a
number of powerful competitors for the state-owned Bulgargaz
and Bulgartransgaz.
By focusing on the impact of state-owned intermediaries in nat-
ural gas transportation and distribution on the competing interests
of Bulgarian state policy, Russian state interests (represented by
Gazprom’s proxy in Bulgaria, Overgas Inc.2) and the EU, the paper
aims to explain the unique situation of the Bulgarian natural gas sec-
tor and to introduce another type of intermediary3 in the natural gas
supply chain. The paper focuses on examining the role of state-
owned intermediaries positioned between upstream (domestic pro-
ducers like Melrose Resources and the main natural gas importer,
Gazprom Export) and downstream companies (gas distribution com-
panies like Overgas Inc.). In doing so the research engages with liter-
ature on the transformation of the Bulgarian state and state capture
(Ganev, 2007; Barnes, 2007; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Andreev,
2009), Bulgarian energy policy (Kovacheva, 2010; Silve and Noël,
2010; Tchalakov et al., 2011; Center for the Study of Democracy,
2010; Stefanov et al., 2011) and Balmaceda’s work on energy inter-
mediaries in Lithuania (Balmaceda, 2008).
The paper is structured as follows: the ﬁrst section develops an
understanding of the concept of intermediaries and the nexus
between energy infrastructure networks, intermediaries and
power. The second section offers an overview of the conditions of
natural gas supply in Bulgaria, while the third section outlines
the differences in interests between the four key actors. Sec-
tion ‘The divergent preferences of actors in the EU gas market:
Explaining delays in Bulgarian transposition of EU gas legislation’
focuses on explaining the ensuing problems within Bulgarian nat-
ural gas policy. The paper concludes by explaining the role of Bul-
garian intermediaries in refracting the use of the natural gas transit
pipeline as a transmission belt for Bulgarian state, Russian state
and EU policy objectives (speciﬁcally, the increase of household
gasiﬁcation, full liberalisation of the Bulgarian natural gas market
and increasing the level of transparency in energy policy in
Bulgaria).1 Draft.
2 As explained in Section ‘The Russian state, its proxies Gazprom and Overgas Inc.’
Overgas Inc. is a private company, jointly owned by the Bulgarian Overgas Holding
(50%), Gazprom (0.49%) and GazpromExport (49.51%) (Overgas, 2013b; Gazprom
Export, 2013) and as such is considered to be representative of Gazprom’s main
objectives of increasing its natural gas volume in Europe (Locatelli, 2008). Since the
Russian state has a 50% controlling stake in Gazprom, we argue that Overgas Inc. is
representative of the interests of the Russian state with regards to natural gas supply
to the EU (Gazprom, 2014).
3 Most discussions of intermediaries in natural gas transit refer to midstream
‘‘independent’’ companies with exclusive contracts to buy natural gas straight from
suppliers like Gazprom and resell it at a higher price to companies like Bulgargaz.
Often such companies are closely linked to, or are straightforward subsidiaries of the
upstream company (Ivanova, 2012).Gatekeeping energy infrastructure networks
Intermediaries
The term ‘intermediaries’ is used to describe individuals, organ-
isations, networks, institutions, processes or organisations strategi-
cally located in-between regulators and regulated, public and
private actors, or sets of different social interests (Moss et al.,
2011), where existing boundaries between stakeholders are being
eroded or redeﬁned (Healey et al., 2002; Beveridge and Guy,
2011). Intermediaries can work to facilitate, coordinate, make con-
nections and mediate disputes to enable relationships between dif-
ferent groups of actors. They work by forming a range of (formal
and informal) networks and coalitions, following a speciﬁc order
and/or hierarchy of interests and actors, thus creating new forms
of interdependencies and socio-technical assemblages (Medd and
Marvin, 2011). By doing so, they are enabling the use of energy
infrastructure networks as transmission belts for actors’ interests.
However, intermediaries can work against as well as with, stalling
change and contributing to system obduracy (Moss et al., 2011: 8;
Paddison, 2003; van Lente et al., 2003). Randles and Mander (2011)
discuss the ability of some intermediaries to ‘gate-keep’ within a
system, i.e. to maintain a strategic position within a supply chain
in order to block access of new actors to that system, by exercising
control over access points to products and services, so as to main-
tain existing market structure in the interest of incumbents.
The role of intermediaries is not neutral (Moss et al., 2011).
They translate and redeﬁne what they convey between stakehold-
ers (Latour, 1993). By translating between sets of actors and inter-
ests, intermediaries redeﬁne and reframe, pursuing their own
agendas and creating new realities and meanings. Therefore, inter-
mediaries embedded within natural gas infrastructure in Bulgaria
possess a degree of independence from the interests they are
meant to represent and are capable of changing them. This degree
of independence suggests that their interests, as natural gas inter-
mediaries, constitute a distinguishable set of interests from those
of the Bulgarian state and other supply chain actors (for example,
distribution companies).
Sometimes intermediaries operate strategically so that they can
support a particular socio-technical infrastructure and conﬁgura-
tion of power. Marvin et al. (2011) argue that in the context of frag-
mented infrastructure which is subject to multiple competing
agendas, intermediaries are able to strategically reconﬁgure rela-
tions between different system actors and components in order
to advance particular interests. By virtue of their strategic position
in-between competing interests, between the private and the pub-
lic, and between regulators and regulated, intermediaries can ‘pro-
duce an outcome that would not have been possible, or as effective,
without their involvement’ (Marvin and Medd, 2004: 84–85).Energy infrastructure networks and geometries of power
Networked energy infrastructures such as natural gas transpor-
tation pipelines are capable of unevenly binding spaces together
across cities, regions, nations, and international boundaries, creat-
ing in the process speciﬁc material and social dynamics within
and between these spaces (Amin and Graham, 1998). Energy infra-
structure networks interconnect (parts of) these spaces andmediate
the multiple connections and disconnections within and between
them (Graham and Marvin, 2001). As infrastructure networks
embody what Bijker (1993) calls ‘congealed social interests’, they
can be used by institutions, companies, individuals and the state
to extend their inﬂuence in time and space beyond the ‘here’ and
‘now’ (Curry, 1998: 103), thus sustaining speciﬁc ‘socio-technical
geometries of power’ (Massey, 1993). Thismeans that infrastructure
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ﬂow for some, could at the same time represent geographies of dis-
connection and barriers for others. This contingency of infrastruc-
ture networks conﬁgurations is borne out of biased struggles for
social, economic and political power seeking to be connected and
afﬁrmed (Star, 1999).
Furthermore, energy infrastructure can act as a ‘transmission
belt’ for national policies (Brenner, 1998: 475). Due to the long-
term capital investment required for its construction, energy infra-
structure represents a form of immovable ‘sunk’ capital (Graham
and Marvin, 2001), where national policy ﬁnds material expression
and can be said to be physically embedded.
Thus, nation states, power and infrastructure networks are inti-
mately connected through the materially embedded grids within
national territories. In the case discussed here, this means that
powerful links exist between the Bulgarian state and natural gas
infrastructure (such as transmission pipelines) built and/or con-
trolled by the state or state-owned actors. The linked production
and maintenance of ﬁxed infrastructure networks, such as natural
gas pipelines, is permeated by struggles between actors, institu-
tions and companies with varying social, economic, and political
power. The infrastructure networks linking producers, traders
and distributers of natural gas in Bulgaria are, in fact, dynamic pro-
cesses only temporarily stabilised, requiring continuous effort to
be maintained. This is done by maintaining the links between
the key nodes of these networks: the different points of connec-
tion, production, transformation and consumption. Thus infra-
structure networks can be understood as large assemblages of
social and technical actors and interdependencies, producing spe-
ciﬁc ‘geographies of enablement and constraint’ (Law and Bijker,
1992: 301), ‘connection, dependency and control’, as well as ‘choke
points’ (Bridge et al., 2013: 333).
The different stages of the processes of privatisation, deregula-
tion and unbundling of energy infrastructure proceed at varying
paces and include intermediary stages of infrastructural restruc-
turing depending on the particular national contexts of transition
and the characteristics of the infrastructure network such as insti-
tutional and regulatory capacity. The ﬁrst stages of infrastructural
restructuring do not always automatically mean a move towards
competitive markets and para-statal organisations can play a sig-
niﬁcant role in the process of transition. Para-statal organisations
are usually owned and controlled by the state, and although they
are designed to run like commercial companies, they often receive
government subsidies to fund capital expenditure, and operate
independently of market incentives (Kessides, 1993).
The changing ownership of infrastructure due to the processes of
privatisation and unbundling have introduced a range of new
actors, creating complex interface spaces between users, providers
and regulators (Jessop, 1995; Brenner, 1999). Such structural
changes could lead to multiplication of actors and also ‘power cen-
tres and scales at which decision-making is exercised’ to ‘the local,
national, European and international scale’ (Kaika, 2003: 302). In
the case of Bulgaria, energy policy has transformed from a fairly
coherent Soviet controlled national arena in 1989 to an array of
decision-making and power centres simultaneously located at the
national, European and Russian spheres (by virtue of a transit and
import monopoly in gas).4 Along with the diminishing role of the
state, Pickles and Jenkins note that ‘[p]rivatisation and the growth
of non-state economic actors have transformed exchange relations’
(2009: 9). All these processes are creating a need for the introduction
of intermediaries to (1) manage the relations within this triad of
actors and everyone else; and to (2) ensure interconnectedness and4 One might also argue that the local is becoming increasingly important after
environmental campaigners succeeded in a moratorium on shale gas exploration in
the country in January 2012 (Reuters, 2012).a ﬂow of information, knowledge and natural gas through the energy
infrastructure networks (Graham and Marvin, 2001).
Energy infrastructure networks reﬂect and reinforce existing
geographies of power concentrated within speciﬁc nodes and
places (Warf, 2009). Natural gas pipelines reﬂect the powerful
vested interests of state and capital, thus making them ‘power
geometries’, through which power is continuously reproduced.
This allows us to consider natural gas infrastructure in Bulgaria
as a series of sites ‘where the social structures and relations of
power, domination and resistance are interwoven’ (Sharp et al.,
2000: 26).
The geography of natural gas
Why natural gas matters to the EU
EU dependency on energy imports increased from less than 40%
of gross energy consumption in the 1980s to 54% by 2011
(Eurostat, 2013). Natural gas import dependency is 67% (Eurostat,
2013) and is predicted to increase to 80% by 2030 (BP, 2012),
due to incrementally-increasing EU gas demand and declining EU
gas production (European Commission, 2011b: 11–12). The impor-
tance of natural gas for the energy security of Member States is
also increasing, with the push for intermittent renewable sources
such as wind and solar under the EU’s 2020 targets, because of
its energy efﬁciency levels, fast ﬁre-up rate and relative ﬂexibility
in terms of location.
High levels of dependency on Russian energy imports have
become a key concern for the EU due to gas supply disruptions
and the increasing oil-indexed prices of gas imports from Russia5
and the gas supply ‘crises’ of January 2006, March 2008 and January
2009 (BBC, 2006; Womack, 2009; Pirani et al., 2009), when Russia’s
disputes with transit countries over payments disrupted the ﬂow of
natural gas to Europe. Since 2009 in particular, dependency on Rus-
sian gas has become politicised and securitised at the EU level
(Maltby, 2013).
In September 2009 the European Council adopted legislation to
mitigate the consequences of potential disruptions to supplies col-
lectively known as the Third Energy Package. It included directives
concerning the internal markets in electricity (No. 72) and natural
gas (No. 73) (European Parliament and Council, 2009a,b). Further
legislation (Regulation 715/2009), concerned preventing the dis-
crimination against third party access (by companies such as Over-
gas) to natural gas transmission networks which are owned in the
case of Bulgaria by Bulgartransgaz (European Parliament and
Council, 2009c). Thus, Bulgaria’s natural gas system and infrastruc-
ture landscapes increasingly depend on decisions made outside the
country, in Brussels and Moscow, a process Bridge et al. (2013:
336) call a re-territorialisation of national energy infrastructure.
Natural gas in Bulgaria
Communist central planning purposely led Bulgaria, as well as
most of the countries in Comecon6, to become heavily reliant on
energy imports from Russia. The created dependence was a way of
embedding Russian political power in the region. As Bouzarovski
(2009: 455) explains, energy transmission infrastructures were con-
structed in such a way so as to allow centripetal links between the
Soviet Union (especially Russia) and the Comecon states, rather than
multilateral connections between the latter. Such divisions wereFor example, in October 2003 the Russian Natural Gas border price in Germany
(in US Dollars per Thousand Cubic Meters) was 134.28 – this had increased to 407.69
in October 2013, after reaching 16.02 in October 2008 (IMF, 2013).
6 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance – a trade organisation for Communist
countries – from 1949 to 1991.
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played a major symbolic role in the spatial reproduction of and ‘roll-
ing out’ of Soviet power across the region; the main socio-technical
‘threads’ that would bind the vast territory of the Soviet Union and
its satellite states into a coherent whole. By the 1980s, 90% of Bul-
garia’s oil and gas was imported from the USSR and Katsikas claims
that by the mid-1990s, Russian ofﬁcials were permitted ‘to interfere
in Bulgaria’s politics to achieve certain political and economic goals’
(2012: 146–147).
In 2011, 86% of natural gas used in Bulgaria was imported from
Russia (Eurostat, 2013) and Russian foreign policy is still considered
to ﬂow through European pipelines (Bouzarovski, 2010: 175–176),
particularly when asymmetrical leverage is the case, as with the gas
trade relationship between Bulgaria and Russia. Since 1974, Russia
has delivered over 154.81 bcm of gas to Bulgaria (Gazprom Export,
2013). Bouzarovski and Bassin argued that exploiting energy
resources and exports are key to Russia’s goal of restoring the coun-
try’s ‘global status as a derzhava or Great Power’ (Bouzarovski and
Bassin, 2011: 788) and, in 2011, exports to the EU by Gazpromwere
150 bcm, of which exports to Bulgaria are 2.8 bcm or 2% of Gaz-
prom’s EU exports. This is almost identical to neighbouring Greece
(2.9 bcm) and Romania (2.8 bcm), but in comparison, Germany rep-
resents 23% of Gazprom’s exports (34 bcm) and Poland 7%
(10.25 bcm) (Gazprom, 2013). Despite being a small market for
imports, 10% (15.1 bcm) of Russian gas exports to Europe in 2011
transited through Bulgaria’s territory (Bulgartransgaz, 2013c: 17).
Despite being formally unbundled, the production and trans-
portation of natural gas are still controlled by the large integrated
utilities that grew out of the former state monopoly, resulting in a
complex patchwork of public and private ownership (Bouzarovski,
2009). Governing the natural gas supply system in Bulgaria is an
area of contestation between governance based on market forces
and institutions, and ‘state centred, power-based geopolitics’ –
i.e. state capture (Westphal, 2006: 58). This is partially due to
the speciﬁc socio-political and cultural context of energy gover-
nance in Bulgaria. By the end of the 1980s Noutcheva and Bechev
claimed that, ‘the state was captured not only from above (by
the communist leadership) but also from below (by societal net-
works), which seriously constrained its policy-making and imple-
mentation capacity’ (Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008: 128; also
Andreev, 2009: 389). Former communist elites were well posi-
tioned to gain from the market transition in the 1990s and rapid
privatisation was a catalyst for further state capture by ‘private
economic actors’ (Barnes, 2007: 71; Ganev, 2007). This legacy ‘con-
siderably slowed down vital reforms’ (Noutcheva and Bechev,
2008: 128; also Andreev, 2009: 389).
One governance practice which facilitates and illustrates the
level of state capture in the Bulgarian energy sector is the rotation
of selected energy experts within the Bulgarian legislative, regula-
tory, administrative and ﬁnancial bodies involved in the natural
gas sector in the country. Natural gas experts often have life-long
careers rotating (2–5 years) between working at Bulgaria’s natural
gas regulatory commission (SEWRC), the Ministry of Energy, the
state-owned single transportation operator (Bulgartransgaz), the
sole state-owned importer and distributor (Bulgargaz) and the Bul-
garian Energy Holding (interviews 6; 7; 8, 2011). This practice
facilitates maintaining strong ties between these different actors
and institutions, and contributes towards presenting a united front
(so one institution is very rarely ‘seen’ criticising another) and
making allowances for their failure to perform (interview 12,
2011). This circulation of elites maintains a ‘closed circle of energy
experts’ in Bulgaria (CSD, 2010: 31), who have a disproportionate
inﬂuence on state energy policy-making. The circulation of a small
number of energy elites (Tchalakov et al., 2011: 12) facilitates a
high level of convergence between these key actors and under-
mines the implementation of EU and national policy.The transit and supply contractual relationships and negotia-
tions between Bulgaria and Gazprom have been complex and
dynamic, with both countries struggling to balance between the
past concessions about price and volumes, and objectives about
transit fees and market share. Signiﬁcantly, in 1996 Gazprom
Export and Bulgargaz signed a memorandum extending the exist-
ing transit contract for natural gas through the territory of Bulgaria
to third countries till 2030 (Gazprom Export, 2013). The memoran-
dum maintained the volume of transit gas at 17.8 bcm p.a. How-
ever, in 2012, Gazprom Export and Bulgargaz signed a direct
long-term contract for natural gas delivery, which provides for
the delivery of up to 2.9 bcm of gas annually till the end of 2022
(Gazprom Export, 2013). The contract removed the middlemen in
the natural gas supply to Bulgaria: Overgas, a 50% Gazprom owned
gas trading company andWIEE – a Gazprom-Wintershall joint ven-
ture (MEET, 2012). Thus the natural gas from Russia is now sup-
plied exclusively by Gazprom and purchased exclusively by
Bulgargaz, via one pipeline as shown in Fig. 1 below (Bulgargaz,
2013). Once it reaches the Bulgarian border, the natural gas starts
ﬂowing through Bulgartransgaz’s pipelines until it reaches munici-
pal borders (see Fig. 1).The divergent preferences of actors in the EU gas market:
Explaining delays in Bulgarian transposition of EU gas
legislation
To date, Bulgaria has experienced signiﬁcant delays in the
transposition of EU natural gas legislation, in particular the Second
and Third Energy Packages (European Commission, 2007). In 2011
the European Commission reasserted its vision that full third-party
access to gas pipelines should be implemented and supply sources
diversiﬁed in view of high dependence on imports from Russia
(European Commission, 2011a).
In November 2012 a Commission report (European Commission,
2012a) stated that there was only ‘partial transposition of the Third
Energy Package Directives’ and one infringement procedure still
open on the Second Energy Package. For the Third Energy Package,
the Commission opened infringement procedures for gas in Sep-
tember 2011, followed by a ‘Reasoned Opinion’ in February 2012
and a referral to the Court of Justice in January 2013, proposing a
daily penalty of €8500, or €3.1 million p.a. (European Commission,
2013).
These delays can be explained by the divergence of interest of
four key actors – the Bulgarian state, the EU, the Russian state
and its proxy in Bulgaria Overgas Inc., and the state owned inter-
mediaries Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz. These different interests
are derived from perceptions of energy security and economic gain
that are at odds with one another. Deﬁnitions of energy security
vary – both the EU and Bulgaria prioritise reliability of supplies,
prices through supply diversiﬁcation and environmental sustain-
ability (European Commission, 2011b; Bulgarian Government,
2011a: 21). Meanwhile, the Russian state focuses more on security
of demand, reﬂecting its role as an energy exporter (Russian
Government, 2010) (see Table 1).The EU
The EU is seeking increased security of supply through: (1) an
interconnected internal market and (2) reliability of pricing
through increased competition within the internal market. The
Energy Policy for Europe (European Parliament and Council,
2007) established that the main objectives were those of compet-
itiveness, sustainability and security of supply. Energy security is
to be achieved through diversifying energy sources and the provi-
sion of ‘[r]eliable energy supplies at reasonable prices for
Fig. 1. Map of the Bulgarian natural gas pipeline network, which denotes areas with no access to natural gas.
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ing the objectives of reliability of supplies and reduced import
dependency requires an improvement of both the internal and
external dimensions of security of supply. The internal element
relates to an interconnected, internal energy market, energy efﬁ-
ciency to reduce demand and increased use of renewables.
Within the EU there is a perception that Russia also uses energy
to exert political leverage from these assets to maximise income
and preferential negotiation outcomes in energy and other spheres(Hulbert, 2011; interviews 1; 2; 3, 2011). To this end, the Commis-
sion was empowered by the 2010 Security of Gas Supply Regula-
tion (994/2010) to receive information on Member State energy
infrastructure investments and intergovernmental energy agree-
ments (European Parliament and Council, 2010: Article 13) and,
in speciﬁc cases, ‘give an ex-ante assessment of the conformity of
a future intergovernmental agreement with the EU law before such
agreement is signed’ for ‘conformity with EU law and EU security
of supply objectives’ (European Commission, 2011c). In September
Table 1
Actor interests/preferences regarding the natural gas supply within Bulgaria.
Actors Preferences/interests Strategies
EU Liberalisation and increased competition of the natural gas pipelines Legislation (3rd energy package)
Russian state/Gazprom/Overgaz Access to Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz’ pipelines Leverage through infrastructure ownership and
supporting EU legislation
Bulgarian state To maintain strategic position of intermediaries; increase the level of
household gasiﬁcation; and implement the EU liberalisation packages
Prioritize maintaining the status quo and keep close ties
with the regulator, Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz
Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz To keep their strategic position and control over natural gas
infrastructure
Use its strategic position and close relationship with the
regulator and the state to block change to the status quo
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whether sales of Russian gas by Gazprom in Eastern Europe,
including Bulgaria, were anti-competitive and whether there was
abuse by Gazprom of its dominant market position (Europa,
2012a).7.
Increasing competition and moving closer to a common exter-
nal EU energy policy are priorities for EU legislation (directives
and regulations) that require the full liberalisation and unbundling
of the natural gas market in Bulgaria and objectives include a sig-
niﬁcant increase in household gasiﬁcation within the EU as a whole
(European Commission, 2010b). However, certain institutional,
regulatory and technical (infrastructure) aspects of Bulgargaz’
and Bulgartransgaz’ operation in fact present obstacles to EU liber-
alisation policy. The natural gas Transmission System Operator
(TSO) Bulgartransgaz is far from being completely legally and oper-
ationally unbundled from the public supplier Bulgargaz. In Febru-
ary 2012 the Commission issued warning letters (Reasoned
Opinions) in response to delays in liberalising the gas market in
Bulgaria (Europa, 2012b) and in January 2013 referred Bulgaria
to the Court of Justice of the EU (European Commission, 2013).
The legal framework for unbundling (the Bulgarian Energy Act)
suffered from signiﬁcant inconsistency with EU legislation, partic-
ularly in terms of (1) granting and managing Third Party Access on
a non-discriminatory basis between system users or classes of sys-
tem users (Art. 17.2.c. of the Gas Directive 2009/73/EC); and (2)
provisions which state that the TSO shall at all times ensure it
has the resources it needs in order to carry out the activity of trans-
mission properly and efﬁciently and develop and maintain an efﬁ-
cient, secure and economic transmission (Art. 18.2 of the Gas
Directive 2009/73/EC, European Parliament and Council, 2009b).
These are discussed in more detail below. Operationally, Bulgargaz
and Bulgartransgaz are still sharing the same premises, IT systems
and identical trademarks, in direct breach of Directive 2009/73/EC
(Ivanova, 2012; European Parliament and Council, 2009b).The Bulgarian State
Although the Bulgarian Energy Act of 2003 attempted to update
the national regulatory oversight with the establishment of SEWRC
(Bulgarian Government, 2003), this has largely failed, leaving the
natural gas market in the country even less free than the market
for electricity, exhibiting ‘full legal, but zero actual liberalisa-
tion. . .[with] regulated regional or municipal monopolies’ (Nitzov
et al., 2010). The Commission raised concerns about SEWRC in
November 2012, regarding its insufﬁcient budget, instability of
management and government intervention rather than a legal
framework providing regulatory independence (European
Commission, 2012c: 74).7 ‘First, Gazprom may have divided gas markets by hindering the free ﬂow of gas
across Member States. Second, Gazprom may have prevented the diversiﬁcation of
supply of gas. Finally, Gazprom may have imposed unfair prices on its customers by
linking the price of gas to oil prices. . .[which] may constitute a restriction of
competition and lead to higher prices and deterioration of security of supply’ (Europa,
September 2012).While the quest for further liberalisation and unbundling of the
natural gas market in the country failed to gain ground due to pro-
longed delays in the transposition of key EU directives, the Bulgar-
ian government was compliant in rhetorically committing to other
aspects of EU energy strategy. For example, although Bulgaria has
very limited domestic natural gas production, the government
committed to signiﬁcantly increasing the level of household gasiﬁ-
cation in the country by 2020, an objective lifted, almost word-for
word, from EU strategy documents, without making any provisions
for this transition from the current level of 1.5% to 30% (interview
12, 2011; Bulgarian Government, 2011a: 50, 67).
The evolution of Bulgaria’s understanding of energy security
since its accession to the EU in January 2007, with regards to its rec-
ognition of its high level of dependency on Russian gas, has followed
patterns of amity and enmity with Russia similar to those identiﬁed
in International Relations theory by Buzan and Waever (2003: 47),
covering a spectrum of relationships between the two states from
friendship or alliances to those based on fear, and affected by bal-
ance of power, ideology, territory, ethnic lines, and historical prece-
dent. Until 2009, the ruling Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)
maintained that continued and increased dependency on Russian
energy sources would increase Bulgarian energy security
(Bulgarian Government, 2008). Traditionally Russia has been per-
ceived as a security guarantor rather than threat in Bulgaria. This
perception has been challenged by Bulgaria’s membership of the
EU, supply disruptions in 2006 and 2009, and a change of govern-
ment in 2009 (Maltby, forthcoming). The 2011 Bulgarian National
Security Strategy recognised that ‘[h]eavy dependence on energy
resources creates economic and political vulnerabilities’ (Bulgarian
Government, 2011a: 35) and also that ‘[n]ational security is essen-
tially contingent on energy stability’ (Bulgarian Government,
2011a: 38).
The 2011 Bulgarian Energy Strategy stated priorities include:
 Ensuring independence of the electricity and gas transmission
system operators through their unbundling along with the
transmission assets from the energy generation/supply/provi-
sion functions.
 Increased independence and extended powers of the national
regulators, and co-operation of the national Regulators at Euro-
pean level.
 Increasing the transparency of the market’ (Bulgarian
Government, 2011b: 29).
However, the struggle to reconcile its new alliances and policy
with the EU with its existing material infrastructure makes it difﬁ-
cult for the Bulgarian state to negotiate and prioritise these. Frag-
mented by bouts of privatisation, liberalisation and unbundling,
the Bulgarian state relies heavily on para-statal organisations (such
as Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz), under the banner of the Bulgarian
Energy Holding (BEH), to govern the energy sector. This takes places
through a triad of power between the state, the state regulator SEW-
RC and BEH (and its companies).
Using state-owned energy companies as social buffers – for
example, by absorbing losses from non-paying companies such
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tice in Bulgaria (Bouzarovski et al., 2012), which makes it difﬁcult
for the state to give up such mechanisms for price control and
access to the proﬁtable aspects of natural gas transmission (inter-
views 9; 10; 11; 12, 2011).8 Furthermore, natural gas prices in Bul-
garia are regulated for both household and industry consumers.
SEWRC has continuously pressed Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz to
keep the price of natural gas down in an attempt to control some
of the social effects on consumers. This has happened at the expense
of infrastructure development (Nenova, 2010; Nitzov et al., 2010).
Instead of selling natural gas at regulated prices to only a number
of protected consumers such as household and small industry con-
sumers with the rest sold at market-determined prices, Bulgargaz
sells all natural gas at regulated prices, including to medium and
large industries. This price ceiling imposed by SEWRC means that
the natural gas price in Bulgaria is signiﬁcantly lower than the
weighted average price fully dependent on the supply and demand
conditions (Ivanova, 2012; UNECE, 2012).
Using Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz as social buffers by the Bul-
garian government is made possible by the regulator SEWRC,
which World Bank and European Commission reports (2013) con-
cluded has insufﬁcient technical and ﬁnancial capability to fulﬁl its
duties (World Bank, 2013; European Commission, 2012c). SEWRC’s
staff numbers were deemed inadequate considering the Regula-
tor’s scope of activities, while its budget was ranked as the second
lowest per employee in Europe (World Bank, 2013). Furthermore,
SEWRC’s dependence on the state is not only due to the circulation
of energy elites in Bulgaria, but also has structural and legal roots.
Although Article 10 of the Energy Act (2003) guarantees the
independence of the Regulator, Article 11.2 postulates that the
Chairman, the Deputy Chairman and the members of the Commis-
sion are appointed and discharged by the Council of Ministers and
the Prime Minister (Ivanova, 2012; Nenova, 2010). In addition, its
budget is part of the central budget and not ring-fenced (World
Bank, 2013) and subject to approval by the National Assembly. Fur-
thermore, SEWRC is not free to allocate its resources by its own
discretion, but speciﬁed by the Council of Ministers (for example
the latter adopts the tariffs charged by the Regulator). This political
and ﬁnancial dependence of SEWRC is enabled by the lack of
accountability guidelines for SEWRC in the Energy Act (Energy
Ecology Economy, 2012). In 2013, SEWRC was weak as indepen-
dent regulator and lacked the political, ﬁnancial and technical
power to adequately oversee and regulate the liberalisation pro-
cesses taking place within the Bulgarian natural gas sector.
The relationship between the two intermediaries Bulgargaz and
Bulgartransgaz is complex and can be analysed in relation to other
stakeholders. In the context of BEH, both Bulgargaz and Bulgar-
transgaz are part of a close circle of institutions used arbitrarily
by the Bulgarian state to control different aspects of the energy
sector. It is because of the ability of the state to mobilise certain
aspects of Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz to achieve its ends that
the Bulgarian state is prepared to go to extreme lengths to preserve
their strategic position in the natural gas supply network. This is
evident from the failure of SEWRC to exercise control over their
activities, and the failure of the government to change the terms
of Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz operation despite numerous
requests by the European Commission and distribution companies,
including Overgas. For example, although Overgas submitted a
complaint to the European Commission against Bulgartransgaz in
2011 for refusing to provide access to its pipelines, as required
under the Third Energy package (Energy Ecology Economy, 2011),8 Energy prices played a signiﬁcant role in the resignation of the Bulgarian
government in February 2013 (Novinite, 2013).and despite several similar complaints to SEWRC, there has been
no response from the latter.
BEH is considered to be ‘too close to the government and. . .not
an independent entity with the government as shareholder as the
law states it is’, which ‘deprives BEH of corporate decision-making
and identity’, politicises decision-making (with the Energy Minis-
ter commenting on behalf of BEH rather than the managers) and
undermines competitiveness (interview 4, 2011). BEH ‘is very well
placed to inﬂuence policy and regulatory choices in a way that pre-
serves its dominant position’ (Silve and Noël, 2010: 15). However,
as the discussion will show, state-owned Bulgargaz and Bulgar-
transgaz also possess a level of independence from the state and
do not function as passive or neutral means of achieving the state’s
objectives. State-owned Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz are capable
of acting in their own self-interest, even if their (in)actions go
against the interest of the Bulgarian government.
Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz
Bulgargaz is the state-owned sole public supplier of natural gas
for the territory of Bulgaria. It is responsible for providing custom-
ers with an uninterrupted and qualitative supply of natural gas and
as such purchases natural gas from gas production enterprises and
gas traders9 and negotiates gas transmission services with TSO and
Distribution Service Operators, and for gas storage services with
Storage Service Operators (Bulgargaz, 2013). Bulgargaz’s importance
for the state has allowed it a privileged position within the natural
gas sector and the ability to ‘dictate its own terms’ (interviews 9;
10, 2011). Bulgartransgaz is a state-owned Transmission System
Operator (TSO) performing licensed activities of natural gas trans-
mission and storage. It owns and operates the national gas transmis-
sion network on the territory of Bulgaria to natural gas distribution
companies and industrial consumers, as well as the transmission
network for transit transmission of natural gas transmission through
the territory of Bulgaria to Romania, Turkey, Greece and Macedonia
(Bulgartransgaz, 2013a).
In short, Bulgargaz acts as a gas trader, buying natural gas from
external suppliers like Gazprom and selling it to natural gas distri-
bution companies, while Bulgartransgaz is responsible for the
management of the national pipeline network. Bulgartransgaz’
pipelines do not enter municipal territory, nor do they reach all
municipalities in Bulgaria. Once the natural gas reaches municipal
borders, it is sold to the gas distribution companies, which are
responsible for constructing the pipeline infrastructure within
municipalities in order to deliver the gas to consumers (interviews
9; 10; 11, 2011).
Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz emerged from the state company
Neft i Gaz (Oil and Gas) established in 1973 and subsequently
renamed Gazosnabdyavane in 1975 and Bulgargaz EAD in 1990.
In 2007, in compliance with the requirements of the Energy Act
and Directive 2003/55/EC,10 Bulgargaz EAD was organisationally
and legally unbundled into Bulgargaz Holding EAD, including Bulgar-
transgaz EAD, Bulgargaz EAD and Bulgartel EAD. A year later these
companies were incorporated into the 100% state-owned BEH
(BEH, 2013; Bulgartransgaz, 2013b).
The processes of liberalisation and privatisation have involved
shifts in the balance of power, the relationships between utility
companies, state regulators and consumers (Newbery, 1999;
Finger and Allouche, 2002; Page and Bakker, 2005), necessitating
the reordering of existing relations. Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz
are strategically ‘located’ intermediaries providing a speciﬁc9 In volumes, needed for covering the demand of the customers, physically
connected to the gas transmission grid, and for the quantities, contracted for carrying
out the activity of public suppliers (Bulgargaz, 2013).
10 Concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas.
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ests of the Bulgarian state, the Russian state and the EU.
As the sole owners and users of the national natural gas trans-
mission infrastructure Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz are responsi-
ble for its maintenance and development (Ivanova, 2012).
However, there is acknowledgement at state, regulatory, BEH and
industry level that the intermediaries cannot afford – at present
and in the foreseeable future – to update the natural gas infrastruc-
ture network which was constructed under a signiﬁcantly different
energy regime and energy demand patterns in the 1970s (inter-
views 9; 10; 11; 12; 13, 2011). Most signiﬁcantly, ‘[t]he lack of
timely and adequate investment in the development of the gas
transmission network corresponding to the plans for construction
of the gas distribution network, is a major obstacle to the gasiﬁca-
tion in the country’ (Bulgarian Government, 2011a: 50). The per-
centage of Bulgarian municipalities with gas supply is only 15%
compared to more than 90% as EU average. The country is also lag-
ging behind the EU-27 average and its neighbours in terms of the
development of its gas network and levels of household gasiﬁca-
tion (CSD, 2010: 82–83; Ivanova, 2012; MEET, 2011).
As Bulgargaz’ and Bulgartransgaz’ power is physically sunk into
the ground (i.e. the pipelines that are laid) any changes to the
material infrastructure network and how it is used will lead to
changes in the intermediaries’ power and ability to fulﬁl their pur-
pose. Thus, the Bulgarian state-owned intermediaries are inter-
ested in preserving the status quo, while their preferential
treatment by SEWRC, as above and beyond the law (interviews
11; 12; 2011) and political importance for the state, provides them
with the tools to resist change.11
The terms of operation of Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz offer the
opportunity for more strategic forms of policy-driven intervention
through intermediation activities than it is usually possible under
neoliberal governance (Rohracher, 2011). The state-owned inter-
mediaries Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz use an array of formal
(such as sole national licence) and informal institutional arrange-
ments (such as a de facto immunity from SEWRC action) to govern
the Bulgarian natural gas system in a way that accommodates and
excludes speciﬁc sets of interests. Thismeans that although the Bul-
garian state has a vested interest in maintaining the position and
role of Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz, they should not be considered
as one and the same as those of the Bulgarian state.
The para-statal status of Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz itself
suggests a (critical) level of independence of the two from the
state. While the state has successfully retained a considerable
leverage over ﬁnancial, managerial and organisational aspects of
the two intermediaries, it could only maintain it as far as it does
not challenge their strategic position as intermediaries. Conse-
quently, it could be argued that in relation to their strategic posi-
tion as a physical intermediary between the state and SEWRC on
one hand, and Gazprom and Overgas Inc. on the other, Bulgargaz
and Bulgartransgaz are independent of the state and the latter can-
not fully use their infrastructure networks as transmission belts of
policy. This strategic degree of independence of state policy has
repercussions for the stakeholder groups involved. By refusing
access to their pipelines to natural gas distribution companies like
Overgas, Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz are blocking the opening up
of the sector to more competition, further liberalisation and
increasing levels of gasiﬁcation at household level. Although Bul-
gargaz and Bulgartransgaz have close links to the state through
BEH, they retain a strategic level of independence from the state,
which in this case they have used to preserve the status quo.11 The Commission’s report also noted that the State Energy and Water Regulatory
Commission (SEWRC) did not possess the necessary budget and stafﬁng levels needed
to provide regulatory oversight, while there were also concerns about management
stability (European Commission, 2011a).The Russian state, its proxies Gazprom and Overgas Inc
A stated Russian objective is that ‘international policy for the
long term will focus on the possession of energy sources’
(Government of the Russian Federation, 2010). Russian foreign pol-
icy ‘travels’ through Gazprom’s natural gas and pipelines, because
the Russian state owns the majority share of the company and has
deep ties with the latter (Bouzarovski and Bassin, 2011). The Rus-
sian state has a 50% controlling stake in Gazprom (Gazprom, 2014).
Many of the company’s executive management and board mem-
bers also held key positions within the Russian government and
state agencies (Balmaceda, 2008). The level of control of the Rus-
sian state over Gazprom and its subsidiaries is most recently exem-
pliﬁed by the decree of President Putin from 2012 forbidding
Gazprom, its subsidiaries and its ‘daughter companies’ to sign con-
tracts for natural gas export or to provide information about their
activities to third parties (such as the EU and national regulatory
agencies) without approval from the central federal government
(Kapital, 2012; Matiyeshyn, 2012). Such tight control is also exer-
cised over Gazprom’s subsidiary and joint stock companies outside
of Russia, such as Overgas Inc.
Overgas Inc. is a private company, jointly owned by the Bulgar-
ian Overgas Holding (50%), Gazprom (0.49%) and GazpromExport
(49.51%) and its subsidiaries comprise over 55% of the Bulgarian
market (Overgas, 2013b; Gazprom Export, 2013). Considering the
inﬂuence of the Russian state over Gazprom we argue that Overgas
Inc. is representative of the interests of the Russian state with
regards to natural gas supply to the EU. Overgas is the largest pri-
vate natural gas distribution company in Bulgaria, holding 5 out of
a total 38 gas distribution licences awarded by SEWRC and com-
prising over 56% of the market (SEWRC, 2012; Overgas, 2013c).
Thus Overgas is involved in the construction, operation and main-
tenance of gas distribution networks and facilities (Overgas,
2013c). Its self–proclaimed mission is to ‘‘support the intensive
development of residential gasiﬁcation’’ in Bulgaria (Overgas,
2013a). This is seen as a way to maintain Overgas’ dominant posi-
tion in the Bulgarian market and to increase its consumer base.
A key barrier to achieving these objectives is gaining access to
Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz’ transmission pipelines and natural
gas storage facilities (Kapital, 2012; Ivanova, 2012; interviews 9;
11, 2011). Neither of the ﬁrst two objectives is possible without
the third one (interviews 9; 11, 2011). These three objectives align
with the two priorities of the Russian state: (1) to maintain and
increase its consumer base in Europe (Russian Government, 2010:
15; Gazprom, 2013)12 and, (2) to gain more control over infrastruc-
ture in EU member states (Medvedev cited in Perevodika, 2010).
The process of gasiﬁcation involves the construction of the gas
pipeline to the point of ﬁnal consumption, the construction of
gas installation and the supply of natural gas to consumers
(whether household or industrial) and is carried out by natural
gas distribution companies like Overgas (interview 10, 2011).
According to the Bulgarian government, the development of the
distribution network and gasiﬁcation are undermined ‘mostly
due to the lack of corporate and regulatory policy for the planned
development of the transmission network. . .[and] the legally
unclear differentiation between transmission and distribution net-
works’ (Bulgarian Government, 2011a: 50).
Since the largest share of the proﬁt in the supply of natural gas
is made in the ﬁnal sale to consumers, i.e. its distribution, Overgas
Inc. will increase its proﬁts in Bulgaria by increasing the number of
household consumers (interview 11, 2011). Thus, for Overgas Inc.,
Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz failure to provide access to the12 ‘[T]he following must be provided. . .increasing energy supplies to the world’s
largest consumers’ (Russian Government, 2010: 15).
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sion route obstructs the realisation of Overgas’ objectives and Rus-
sian state policy (interview 9, 2011). Overgas will be able to
achieve its objectives if the EU Third Energy Package is fully imple-
mented in Bulgaria and on this rare occasion the interests of the
EU, the Russian state and its proxies, and the Bulgarian state – to
increase the level of household gasiﬁcation – overlap.
Bulgarian natural gas policy problems
The presence of the state-owned natural gas intermediaries Bul-
gargaz and Bulgartransgaz not only affects attempts to implement
Russian and EU energy strategy, but also creates two signiﬁcant
problems within the national natural gas policy. Firstly, it results
in the inability of the Bulgarian state to reconcile maintaining
the state-owned intermediaries and the inevitable need to fully
implement the Third Energy Package (to remove the intermediar-
ies and/or to allow access to their pipelines to private gas distribu-
tion companies) and thus put a stop to the series of infringement
procedures and (proposals of) ﬁnes by the Commission. The second
problem is between Bulgartransgaz’ and Bulgargaz’ inability to
develop the national natural gas infrastructure and the stated
national objectives of increased household gasiﬁcation. The per-
centage of households using gas can be increased signiﬁcantly if
the liberalisation of the market in the country is successfully com-
pleted (i.e. private gas distribution companies have access to the
national pipeline network) and a more extensive fast high-pressure
transmission system in the territory of the country is constructed
(Bulgarian Government, 2011a: 11). However, while gas distribu-
tion companies like Overgas argue that this should be the job of
the state-owned Bulgargaz, because otherwise the price of natural
gas to the ﬁnal consumers would have to increase manifold, the
state and SERWC recognise that Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz
are not able to make major infrastructure investments because of
their role as a social buffer (interviews 9; 10; 14, 2011).
Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz are key nodes in the Bulgarian
natural gas network. Their strategic position and role as intermedi-
aries between the Bulgarian state, natural gas distribution compa-
nies like Overgas Inc., Gazprom, the EU and SEWRC has made them
focal points not only in the physical ﬂow of natural gas from Gaz-
prom to Bulgarian consumers, but also in the implementation of
national, EU and Russian policy. Focusing on their operation and
impact on all four actors allows the discussion of some of the sig-
niﬁcant institutional, regulatory and technical obstacles to full
market liberalisation of the natural gas sector in Bulgaria. Although
Overgas Inc. has repeatedly asked Bulgartransgaz for access to its
pipelines, access has been denied on technical grounds. Bulgar-
transgaz claims that it needs more time in order to allow such
access to its pipelines, given the high number of entry and exit
points required by Overgas Inc. (interview 11, 2011).
Although the Bulgarian state has expressed desire to increase
the level of household gasiﬁcation in the country and has taken
steps to implement some reforms associated with the Third Energy
Package, its ability to realise these is impaired by the lack of mate-
rial and institutional landscapes to support these changes. As
shown in the discussion above, the weak regulator and the close
relationship between the state, SEWRC and BEH, facilitated
through the circulation of energy elites between the three, create
a complex matrix of interests which can facilitate, distort and block
state policy. Although the state can use Bulgargaz and Bulgartrans-
gaz to support state policies, it can only do so insofar as it does not
change the terms of their operation and challenge their strategic
position as intermediaries. For example, years of using Bulgargaz
as means of ‘‘subsidising’’/supporting struggling municipal heating
companies, such as Soﬁa District Heating company, which in 2013
owed 100 million leva to Bulgargaz and 360 million leva to BEH(Republic of Bulgaria Council of Ministers, 2013), has limited Bul-
gargaz’s ﬁnancial stability (Bulgargaz, 2012) and inadvertently
made it impossible for it to provide the levels of investment
needed to expand the natural gas network and increase household
gasiﬁcation (interviews 9; 12, 2011). In short, at present the Bul-
garian state is able to only follow the letter of EU energy reforms
and not its spirit, since this would require changing its relationship
with Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz, introducing a strategic level of
distancing from SEWRC and giving up Bulgargaz and Bulgratrans-
gaz’ strategic position as sole operators of the national natural
gas transit and transmission network.Conclusion
The existence and operation of Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz
has stalled the implementation of EU gas market liberalisation in
the country (interviews 10; 11; 12, 2011), in turn undermining
the EU’s energy security strategy. Furthermore, the two natural
gas intermediaries undermine the ability of the Bulgarian state to
use the natural gas infrastructure network within the territory of
the country as a transmission belt for its energy policy.
The institutional capacity of the Bulgarian state is limited,
regarding ﬁrstly the development of independent energy policy
and its implementation in the face of pressures from the EU, Russia
and Bulgarian natural gas intermediaries (and from within due to
the circulation of energy elites). Another signiﬁcant reason why
Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz have been able to maintain their
strategic position so far is that the regulator, SEWRC as a regulatory
agency in transition, is weak, dependent on the state and with
strong links to BEH.
Because of Bulgargaz’ and Bulgartransgaz’ level of indepen-
dence from the Bulgarian state to pursue their own interests and
their political signiﬁcance to the state, national policy objectives
such as increased domestic gasiﬁcation are unlikely to be success-
fully implemented while the terms of operation of Bulgargaz and
Bulgartransgaz remain the same. The two state intermediaries rep-
resent ‘choke points’ (Bridge et al., 2013: 333) in the implementa-
tion of the natural gas liberalisation packages and the state
objective of increased domestic gasiﬁcation. For example, they
are able to deliberately stall attempts by the Bulgarian government
to implement reforms in line with the EU’s Third Energy Package.
Furthermore, the close relationship of Bulgargaz and Bulgartrans-
gaz with SEWRC and the Bulgarian state means that they receive
preferential treatment and have a high concentration of market
control, thus making the entrance of new companies to the Bulgar-
ian natural gas market and the creation of more competition more
difﬁcult (Ivanova, 2012; Nenova, 2010).
Liberalisation and unbundling are step processes, which need to
be continuously produced through speciﬁc regulatory and institu-
tional arrangements, such as effectively and progressively increas-
ing the number of market participants and competition between
suppliers. What this paper shows is that state-owned intermediar-
ies could be an obstacle to these processes of change. Further
research could examine whether the ﬁndings we have claimed in
this paper are generalisable, and are applicable to other EU mem-
ber states with similar energy sector characteristics, as well as
whether other Member State intermediaries also pursue their
own agendas through affecting, reshaping and transforming the
policy regimes within which they operate.
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